, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementapproach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf ("The Commission generally is authorized to bring its enforcement actions in either of two forums-a civil action in federal district court or a Commission administrative proceeding (and/or cease-and-desist proceeding) before an Administrative Law Judge-though it has authority to proceed on certain charges or remedies in only one of those forums.") [https://perma.cc/A7YQ-3464]; Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (2015) ("After an investigation reveals a securities law violation, the SEC can refer a matter to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for consideration of criminal charges, file a civil lawsuit in federal district court, or commence an [administrative proceeding]."). For a discussion of situations in which the Commission must bring its actions as administrative proceedings or in federal court, see infra notes 2 and 4. For a discussion of the effects of section 929(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("the Dodd-Frank Act"), which expands the scope of remedies available to the Commission in its administrative proceedings, see infra note 11 and accompanying text.
gain the right to be heard by a federal judge unaffiliated with the Commission-a step that requires an appeal from the Commission's ruling to a federal circuit court of appeals. 8 The Commission is hardly alone in its administration of an internal judicial system; many other federal agencies operate similar adjudicatory bodies in which respondents' rights materially diverge from the rights available in federal court proceedings. 9 The debate over the fairness of the Commission's administrative procedures, and over the discretion the Commission exercises when allocating litigation between federal and administrative venues, ran at a low simmer for decades with only occasional outbursts. 10 However, this relative calm ended in 2013, when the Commission's staff announced plans to rely on expanded administrative remedies created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 11 ("the Dodd-Frank Act") ALJ's decision provided for a right to reapply in one year and six months, respectively. Id. at *2.
8. For critiques of the appeals procedures in SEC administrative proceedings, see infra Part I. Congress granted this request when it passed section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended section 8A of the and to shift litigation that had traditionally been brought in federal court to its in-house administrative proceedings. 12 This announcement kicked over a hornet's nest of protest as critics trumpeted a long list of complaints about the fairness of the SEC's internal process and its Kafkaesque dimensions. 13 They pointed to data suggesting Securities Act, section 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, section 9(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act, and section 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act, to permit the imposition of civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings, in addition to the cease-and-desist orders previously available to the Commission. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862-64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2012)). The Dodd-Frank Act gave the Commission broad authority to impose a civil penalty in an administrative proceeding against any person or company, including unregistered entities and individuals. See id. The Commission can now obtain through internal administrative proceedings essentially most of the remedies it might obtain in federal court. See Ceresney, Keynote Speech, supra note 2 ("As part of Dodd-Frank, Congress expanded the SEC's authority to obtain penalties against any person in an administrative proceeding including unregistered entities and individuals. Under this expanded authority, the Commission has been bringing more enforcement actions in the administrative forum, where it can now obtain the same remedies as in district court."); Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 (noting the expanded authority to obtain civil penalties permitted under section 929P(a) and noting that the SEC "is simply making use of the administrative forum in cases where we previously could only obtain penalties in district court").
12. In late 2013, SEC Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney stated, "Our expectation is that we will be bringing more administrative proceedings given the recent statutory changes [ that the Commission enjoyed a significant home-court advantage when litigating before its own ALJs 14 and challenged the constitutionality of the process by which the Commission appointed its ALJs. 15 Critics also waxed poetic about the Commission's internal procedures as an affront to the principles of due process that can be traced back to the Magna Carta. 16 It was as though a dam holding back pent up rage about the fairness of the Commission's administrative proceedings had suddenly burst.
The Commission then doubled down. In a controversial opinion, the Commission overruled a rare ALJ decision favoring the respondent and, in so doing, emphasized the need for Chevron deference 17 to the SEC's interpretation of the federal securities laws. 18 The Commission's opinion was subsequently vacated on appeal by the First Circuit, but the policy damage was done. 19 Federal judges and other observers warned that the SEC was embarking on a path that would fundamentally alter the common law process that had governed the interpretation of the federal securities DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faceschallenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-its-court-proceedings/ (noting that "a recent push by the agency to bring more cases before its administrative law judges rather than filing charges in federal district court is drawing increased attacks from defense lawyers claiming that the entire process is not just unfair, but also unconstitutional") [ (Feb. 20, 2015) , http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html ("Commission staff has recently indicated that they will recommend instituting more enforcement matters, including insider trading cases, through administrative proceedings rather than going through the federal district courts. . . . [T] his change has the appearance of the Commission looking to improve its chances of success by moving cases to its in-house administrative system.") [https://perma.cc/D5EF-GXHX]; see also infra Part I.
14. For an analysis and critique of these data, see 135 (2011) , and making a bid for Chevron deference from the courts for its interpretations by first asserting that there is "ambiguity in Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a)" and then claiming that its interpretations are "informed by [the SEC's] experience and expertise in administering the securities laws"), rev'd, Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015); see also infra note 94.
19. Flannery, 810 F.3d at 4 (vacating the Commission's ruling and concluding "that the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence"); see also infra note 95. laws for decades. 20 Instead of federal courts serving as full and active, indeed, sometimes dominant, partners in the evolution of the federal securities laws, the SEC's new regime would greatly expand the Commission's ability to control the evolution of the law: the number of securities law cases subject to interpretation by the federal courts would be diminished as the Commission shifted more litigation to the administrative forum. Federal courts would then be limited to resolving securities law issues primarily as raised in private civil actions and federal criminal cases. And, in both of those categories, the Commission would insist on Chevron deference to its prior administrative rulings. All of this would marginalize the role of the Article III judiciary and elevate the importance of the Commission itself and of its ALJs in controlling the evolution of the federal securities laws.
Congress has also entered the fray with two legislative proposals. The Due Process Restoration Act 21 would provide a mandatory right of removal to certain respondents in administrative proceedings and would raise the burden of proof for some cases to a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. 22 The full Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives approved this proposed legislation in early 2016. 23 The bill's potentially broad chilling effect on the Commission's enforcement program has been broadly noted. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 9 ("If it was a mistake to give the S.E.C. such broad authority to bring administrative cases, then using an indirect measure like Mr. Garrett's [Vol. 85 that same time, the Republican chairman of the House Financial Services Committee unveiled a second legislative proposal, the Financial CHOICE Act. 24 This proposal would also give respondents in SEC administrative proceedings the right to remove the enforcement action to federal court and would repeal the practice of judicial deference to SEC interpretation. 25 The Commission has responded with a vigorous defense of its internal proceedings as fair and efficient and has urged that its ALJs are unbiased. 26 The Commission also has emphasized its expertise, and the expertise of its ALJs, in interpreting the federal securities laws. 27 Indeed, a large body of precedent supports the formal legitimacy of the administrative proceedings of the sort relied upon by the Commission. 28 proposal to raise the burden of proof that will keep almost every case out of the administrative process seems like a blunderbuss solution to a narrow problem. Each side of the debate has relied on empirical data to support its position. Critics interpret the data as suggesting that the Commission has a home-field advantage in administrative proceedings. 29 Critics also suggest that the Commission seeks to bring more cases in-house in order to prevail on claims that might not succeed if brought in federal court. 30 The Commission responds with data indicating that there are no material differences in its success rate in administrative and federal court proceedings. 31 However, the data regarding the Commission's win-loss record is more nuanced than either side suggests. The Commission fares relatively poorly in insider trading litigation both in federal court and before its own ALJs. More precisely, the Commission prevailed in only eight of the fifteen (53 percent) insider trading cases resolved in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016-through March 4, 2016. 32 The SEC also lost the single insider trading case brought before an ALJ during that period. 33 But when insider trading cases are excluded from the analysis, the Commission attains a high success rate regardless of whether it litigates in the administrative or federal forum: it prevails in 97 percent of cases litigated before ALJs and in 96 percent of cases litigated in federal court, with this difference being statistically indistinguishable. 34 However, this data must be interpreted with caution because selection bias makes it difficult to draw reasonable inferences from win-loss ratios, even if statistically significant differences arise across administrative and federal forums, which is not the case.
The data regarding the forums in which the Commission files settled matters do, however, show a remarkable shift toward the administrative forum. In fiscal year 2013, the Commission filed 35 percent of its settled matters involving publicly traded companies in an administrative forum. 35 In fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the percentage of actions filed against publicly traded issuers in the administrative forum had more than doubled challenge-even when finding the SEC has made a mistake within it." Thomas K. Potter III, A Renewed Fight Over SEC's Admin Forum Constitutionality, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/585756/a-renewed-fight-over-sec-s-admin-forumconstitutionality [https://perma.cc/ZSQ9-ZUFN]; see also Zaring, supra note 9, at 1159-60 ("Formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which is the process that SEC ALJs offer, has been with us for decades and has never before been thought to be unconstitutional in any way. It violates no rights, nor offends the separation of powers; if anything, scholars have bemoaned the fact that it offers an inefficiently large amount of process to defendants, administered by insulated civil servants who in no way threaten the President's control over the Executive Branch."); infra note 76 (noting that the Seventh Amendment does not bar adjudication of disputes in an administrative forum).
29. to 75 percent. 36 Critics complain that this shift demonstrates that the Commission favors administrative proceedings because of a home-court advantage. In reality, however, these data are exceptionally difficult to interpret because of an identification problem. Respondents have incentives to prefer administrative settlements over federal injunctions, and the dramatic post-Dodd-Frank shift to administrative settlement therefore may reflect respondent preferences at least as much as the Commission's agenda. The inference of home-court advantage based on these settlement data could therefore be ill founded.
But none of this is to suggest that the choice of forum is a matter of indifference. For example, with regard to the law of insider trading, the Commission has made it clear that it disagrees with the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Newman, 37 which held that the personal benefit necessary to establish tippee liability must be pecuniary in nature. 38 The Commission's decision in Flannery 39 makes clear that its interpretation of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 40 differs from the interpretation adopted by several lower courts. 41 And, the U.S. Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, rejected the Commission's favored interpretation of federal securities laws. 42 However, the Commission has not been entirely deaf to complaints about its administrative procedures. For example, the Commission has recently amended its Rules of Practice to allow for a limited number of depositions in administrative proceedings and to extend the timeline for some of its hearings. 43 unresponsive to the fundamental flaws inherent in the administrative process. 44 In defending its shift to administrative proceedings, the Commission also points to section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 45 That provision, for the first time, grants the SEC authority to impose civil penalties on nonregulated entities in administrative proceedings. 46 The Commission can easily reason that Congress would not grant it this expansive new authority unless Congress intended that the Commission exercise this authority precisely by suing a larger number of alleged violators in administrative proceedings rather than in federal court. 47 Otherwise, what purpose would the legislative grant serve? From this perspective, the Commission's expanded emphasis on administrative proceedings is entirely consistent with congressional intent.
More fundamentally still, the U.S. litigation process commonly confers on plaintiffs a first-mover advantage in selecting a litigation forum. 48 Private party plaintiffs regularly search for the forum in which they have the best chance of prevailing, as do federal and state prosecutors when they file criminal claims. 49 Why then the kerfuffle when the SEC exercises a forum selection option by electing to bring an action in an administrative forum rather than in federal court?
The answer to this question is, I think, central to the resolution of the current controversy. Typically, when a plaintiff selects a forum, the factfinder is not in the plaintiff's employ, the appeal is not to the plaintiff itself, and the plaintiff does not control the rules governing the proceeding. The appearance of impropriety under these circumstances is clear, even if one believes that the administrative process is itself largely fair and efficient.
Viewed from this perspective, the appropriate objective is not to end the Commission's reliance on administrative proceedings, or even necessarily to reform those proceedings so that they more closely mimic federal district court trials. Instead, the more appropriate objective may be to assure that 44 . See infra Part II. 45. See supra note 11. 46. See supra note 11. 47. See Henning, supra note 9 ("The Dodd-Frank Act gave the S.E.C. the authority to choose the forum for almost any case, so if there is a culprit here it is Congress, not the agency. It can be argued that the S.E.C. pushed too hard in bringing more cases before its in-house judges, but using the tools provided by Congress to its advantage should not have come as any great surprise.").
48. the mechanism for allocating enforcement matters between administrative and federal forums is fair and acts to provide the Commission with incentives to refresh its internal rules to reflect contemporary litigation realities. Indeed, proposals that would dramatically cut back on the SEC's ability to rely on administrative proceedings could result in a flood of potentially complex litigation to the federal courts, which already complain that they are overburdened. 50 That result is not clearly in the public interest.
So framed, the current debate over the Commission's shift to administrative proceedings presents a problem of institutional design. 51 If a trusted, independent third party, and not the Commission, decided whether any particular case was more fairly and efficiently resolved in an administrative proceeding rather than in federal court, then much of the consternation over the Commission's administrative proceedings would be removed. This independent third party's decisions also could provide incentives for the ongoing modernization of the SEC's internal procedures because the more credible the Commission's claims of fairness and efficiency, the higher the probability that the independent third party would allow the Commission to retain jurisdiction over a larger number of proceedings.
This Article proposes a removal statute that casts the federal judiciary in the role of a trusted, independent third party tasked with the responsibility of determining whether a Commission enforcement proceeding should proceed as an administrative action or in federal court. To economize on the decision-making costs associated with the introduction of the federal courts as such a "traffic cop," this Article proposes that Commission enforcement proceedings be divided into three categories. The first category would include all cases statutorily required to be litigated in the administrative forum as well as all cases for which administrative proceedings are appropriate because of the nature of the question presented and the SEC's specialized expertise. For example, cases alleging violations of the Commission's complex net capital rules, late filing of documents, and the failure to register with the SEC might rationally fall into this category. 52 50. By making removal mandatory upon the request of certain respondents, the Due Process Restoration Act threatens to increase the congestion of federal court dockets by shifting a number of cases out of the administrative forum and into federal court. At the other extreme, a second category would be composed of cases that must be heard in federal court and that may not be brought in administrative proceedings except with defendants' consent. Clearly, litigation calling for remedies unavailable in administrative proceedings (such as freeze orders, orders of contempt, or subpoena enforcement proceedings) would fall in this category and could not be heard in the administrative forum even with respondents' consent. Beyond these easy cases, the definition of this category is sure to be controversial, but, as a first cut, it might be reasonable to suggest that, in light of the Commission's checkered insider trading litigation history, insider trading allegations be resolved in federal court unless the defendants consent to an administrative proceeding. This category also could be expanded to include cases that seek significant monetary penalties or that satisfy other objective indicia of complexity.
The third category would be composed of cases that fall in neither of these two categories. In these residual cases, if the Commission decides to bring an administrative action, then the respondent would be permitted to petition a federal district court for removal at the court's discretion. This removal process would be modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 53 and the statute would articulate criteria and time deadlines governing the removal process. In determining whether to grant a petition for removal, the court would assess the relative merits of administrative versus judicial resolution for the specific facts and legal questions presented by the case at issue. The court also would balance the efficiency considerations associated with docket loads in the federal judiciary. The greater the federal judiciary's confidence in the ability of the Commission's administrative process to resolve a dispute fairly and efficiently, the greater the probability that a court would allow the case to continue in the administrative forum.
This statutory sorting mechanism would help assure that (1) cases that belong in the administrative process stay in the administrative process; (2) cases that belong in the federal courts remain in the federal courts; and (3) cases that could reasonably be resolved in either forum are allocated by a trusted, independent third party through a mechanism that also incentivizes the Commission to improve its internal procedures. This approach differs significantly from other proposals that would, in a rather undifferentiated fashion, cause a large scale and de facto automatic shift of litigation from the administrative forum to federal court. 54 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) ("A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.").
54. Commentators have offered various proposals for allowing respondents to transfer cases out of the administrative forum and into federal court. For a discussion of the Due Process Restoration Act and the Financial CHOICE Act and for criticism of those bills, see supra notes 21-24. Christopher Cox, former Chairman of the SEC, has suggested that "a party who is not a regulated person or entity and who is charged in an administrative proceeding could safely be given the right to remove to federal court." Chris Cox, Partner, Part I of this Article details the historical operation of the Commission's internal administrative procedures and summarizes the consternation over those procedures. Part II describes the Commission's recent response to these critiques, including amendments to its internal rules of procedure. Part III analyzes empirical data cited by both sides to the debate. Finally, Part IV sets forth the rationale for a three-part removal statute as a mechanism for resolving this dispute, outlines the structure of the proposed statute, and describes the legal engineering required to operationalize the proposal.
I. CONSTERNATION OVER THE SEC'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Critics have historically presented a long list of complaints about the fairness of the SEC's internal procedures. However, these complaints must be evaluated in the context of recently adopted amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice 55 that were designed to respond to at least some of these critiques. To better frame the debate about the structure and fairness of the Commission's administrative proceedings, this part describes the rules governing the SEC's administrative proceedings as those rules existed prior to the recent amendments. Part II then describes the Commission's newly amended rules and observes that the SEC's critics remain unmollified by amendments they describe as "modest and incremental reforms" that "do little to address the most fundamental inequities of the SEC's in-house courts and continue to leave respondents before an ALJ at a significant disadvantage." 56 Historically, one of the more frequently voiced complaints against the SEC's Rules of Practice was that proceedings were prosecuted on a rapid timetable 57 that disadvantaged respondents by leaving them inadequate time 57. Prior to the recent amendments, 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 stated that [i]nitial decisions must be filed within the number of days prescribed in the order instituting proceedings-120, 210, or 300 days from the date of service of the order instituting proceedings. Broadly speaking, administrative proceedings instituted pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Exchange Act are designated as 120-day cases, administrative proceedings seeking sanctions as a result of an injunction or conviction are designated as 210-day cases, and administrative proceedings alleging violations of the securities laws were designated as 300-day cases.
to prepare a defense. 58 Respondents also were severely limited in their ability to take depositions and to engage in other forms of exploratory discovery typically available in federal court. 59 Instead, a respondent's
Amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,092 (proposed Oct. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201). It bears emphasis that the actual number of days available for a respondent to prepare for the hearing, once the order instituting proceedings was filed, was materially shorter than these time periods indicate because these time periods include the period during which the ALJ prepared and filed the decision in the case, as well as the time period during which the hearing itself was conducted. A 120-day timeline anticipated approximately one month from the order instituting proceedings to the hearing, approximately two months for the parties to review the transcript and submit briefs, and approximately one month after briefing for the hearing officer to issue an initial decision. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2016). A 210-day timeline anticipated approximately two and one-half months from the order instituting proceedings to the hearing, approximately two months for the parties to review the transcript and submit briefs, and approximately two and one-half months after briefing for the hearing officer to issue an initial decision. Id. A 300-day timeline anticipated approximately four months from the order instituting proceedings to the hearing, approximately two months for the parties to obtain the transcript and submit briefs, and approximately four months after briefing for the hearing officer to issue an initial decision. Id. 58. Critics contend that these deadlines were "unrealistic" and that they significantly curtailed "the ability of defense counsel to fully develop and present a robust defense in an administrative proceeding. not require an expert report and ha [d] no provision for expert depositions." Lieberman, supra note 58, at 3. The only real discovery tool available to respondents was the right to subpoena documents in advance of trial, and even that right was restricted to U.S. territorial boundaries. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.232. In addition, respondents who wished to obtain documents had to apply to the ALJ for a subpoena and demonstrate that it was warranted, and the ALJ had discretion to refuse to issue subpoenas that were "unreasonable, oppressive, excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome." Id.; see also Why the SEC's Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate-Part III, SEC. DIARY (Nov. 18, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/18/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-ofpractice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iii/ ("As a result of this highly restrictive set of rules governing subpoenas by respondents-compared to almost no restrictions for subpoenas issued by the SEC staff during the investigative process-very modest document discovery is possible in SEC administrative proceedings.") [https://perma.cc/S42E-ZWVY]. By contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit broad discovery by all parties of "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the principal source of evidence was the Commission's own investigative file, which the SEC is required to make available to the respondent relatively early in the proceeding. 60 Respondents also had very little time to review and digest the Commission's investigative material-which could amount to hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence-whereas the Commission's staff would often have had years to build a record that could be carefully fashioned to support the SEC's theory of the case. 61 Limiting discovery in needs of the case." See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2014) ("We have previously recognized that the scope of permissible discovery under Rule 26 is 'broad.'"). Rule 26 has traditionally been subject to four limitations:
(1) privileged matter is not discoverable; (2) discovery of material obtained in preparation for trial, including expert testimony, is restricted; (3) a physical or mental examination can be ordered only for good cause and only if physical or mental condition is "in controversy"; and (4) 61. Critics have lambasted the unfairness of permitting the Commission's staff "to investigate matters for several years" and "to interview and take testimony from whomever they choose," while allowing respondents to engage in very little exploratory discovery. Sjoblom Letter, supra note 59, at 2; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 15 ("The lack of pre-hearing discovery adversely affects the respondent rather than the SEC staff. This is because the staff has been able to compile its evidentiary record, including sworn depositions, through its investigation process. In effect, the staff is able to conduct its pre-hearing discovery before beginning the proceeding. The respondents in an administrative proceeding have no comparable opportunity."); Eaglesham, supra note 12 ("The move [to administrative proceedings] is creating a backlash among lawyers and defendants, who say in federal court they have more extensive rights to take witness testimony and collect evidence ahead of a trial. The Commission's position is one-sided. It fails to recognize the substantial disadvantage respondents face in relying only on the product of an extensive ex parte investigation by the staff. The Commission's refusal to make, at a minimum, deposition discovery discretionary with the ALJ when good cause is shown precludes respondents from obtaining evidence from persons who did not provide testimony in the investigation. Moreover, without deposition discovery from witnesses who testified in the investigation, respondents cannot explore the testimony taken by the staff to obtain additional evidence and to test the credibility of witnesses in advance of hearing.
large part to the independent investigation of the Commission's staff also raised the concern that this staff, particularly toward the end of its investigation, "may have lost some objectivity and may be more concerned with proving its case against particular respondents than with uncovering details that might reveal deficiencies in its position." 62 In some situations, however, respondents can "shadow" the Commission's investigation by interviewing the same parties that were questioned by the Commission and by attempting to gather the same documents collected by the SEC. 63 These efforts will not always succeed: witnesses who cooperated with the Commission may refuse to speak with respondent counsel, and documents produced to the Commission by third parties may not be voluntarily produced. 64 The Commission's investigation and timing advantages can therefore persist even when the SEC confronts the most diligent and resourceful opposing counsel.
Also, when comparing federal civil litigation with the Commission's administrative proceedings, it warrants mention that the Commission, in administrative proceedings, is required to produce a broad category of documents pursuant to the Brady rule 65 and to the Jencks Act 66 but that no such production is required in a civil proceeding filed by the Commission. 67 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 372 (2d ed. 2007).
62. KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, supra note 61, at 373; see also Andrew N. Vollmer, Four Ways to Improve SEC Enforcement, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 337-38 (2015) ("The staff is committed to 'winning,' which means having the Commission authorize a proceeding, and that will-to-win warps the fact-gathering process. The staff looks so hard for something that seems wrong or that can be portrayed as wrong that they lose perspective and objectivity."). The result is that counsel for respondents often cannot adequately discover facts in advance of a hearing. See KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, supra note 61, at 373.
63. See Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 ("[I]n many cases respondents know full well what the important evidence is, either because they produced it to us themselves, because it was testimony from their own employees or someone else to whom they have access before the hearing, or because we have shared it with them in testimony or in the course of Wells discussions. So the bottom line is that there are extensive procedural protections in our proceedings and defendants have transparency into the nature of our case and proof well before the hearing commences.").
64. See, e.g., Hudson Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 3 (noting that "[p]otential witnesses fear drawing the Enforcement Division's ire and thus avoid any contact with respondents that might lead to those witnesses being called opposite the Division at the final hearing").
65. The Brady rule, named for Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires prosecutors to disclose to the defense any exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment that is in the government's possession.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). The Jencks Act requires the government, upon motion of the defendant and only after a witness has testified on direct examination, to produce "any statement . . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified." Id. § 3500(b).
67. See, e.g., SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *16 n.44 ("Under Rule 230, which incorporates certain criminal process rights derived from criminal cases and statutes, respondents receive documents that contain material exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) . No analogous provision is present in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 (noting that in administrative proceedings the SEC "ha[s] affirmative Brady obligations to disclose By contrast, the SEC's Rules of Practice require the production of only certain categories of documents, such as subpoenas and transcripts, and production is required only by order of the Commission or the hearing officer. 68 Accordingly, the SEC's "watered-down quasi-Brady obligation" falls short of the full, compulsory production of exculpatory evidence envisioned by the Brady rule. 69 Brady rule and Jencks Act obligations in the administrative setting may therefore not level the playing field as much as the Commission suggests.
Further, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in administrative proceedings. 70 Critics complain that the more liberal standard traditionally applied in Commission administrative proceedings allows the Commission to introduce hearsay and other forms of evidence that are impermissible in federal court. 71 The admission of hearsay evidence "effectively undercut[s] the ability of a [respondent] to challenge the offered evidence through cross-examination, traditionally considered as an essential trial right to discovering the truth." 72 Critics also assert that "the looser evidentiary standards in administrative proceedings compound the problem presented by the number of cases the SEC brings based on purely circumstantial evidence, sometimes without a single witness who can relate firsthand knowledge of any wrongdoing by the respondent." 73 The net result is a system that "reward[s] trial by ambush and result[s] in a distorted record." 74 Critics further point out that juries are available in federal court 75 but not in administrative proceedings. 76 Federal court judges are nominated by the material, exculpatory information and Jencks Act obligations to turn over statements of our witnesses-neither of which apply in our district court proceedings").
68 77 The practice of having SEC employees hear and resolve claims that are filed and prosecuted by the SEC creates the appearance of bias and lack of objectivity. 78 At least one former ALJ has made statements violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trials are to be "preserved" in "suits at common law"); Calling himself a "first-hand witness to and victim of SEC overreach," Cuban's motion opposes the SEC's appeal of Judge Leigh Martin May's decision preliminarily enjoining the SEC's administrative action against Hill. Id. at 1. In the motion, Cuban criticized the Commission's administrative proceedings as "inherently biased," id. at 6, and "lack[ing] the procedural tools required to reach a fair and accurate result," id. at 13. Cuban also attributed his own victory over insider trading charges to "the procedural rules available to him [in federal court], the independence of the judge enforcing those rules, and the independent factfinding by the jury," pointing out that these protections would not have been available had his enforcement action been filed in an administrative forum. Id. at 5. Cuban subsequently consistent with the existence of bias, 79 but a subsequent investigation by the SEC's Office of Inspector General found no "evidence to support the allegations of improper influence." 80 Critics also complain that the first-level appeal from the ALJ's decision is not to a federal court, but to the very same Commission that authorized the proceeding in the initial instance. 81 The five Commissioners are thus in the position of acting both as prosecutors and as judges: prosecutors when authorizing the complaint and judges when ruling on the appeal from the ALJ decision resolving the complaint they initially authorized. While respondents have the right to appeal any Commission ruling to a federal court of appeals, 82 this second-level review is also criticized as flawed, most notably because Commission orders are afforded substantially more deference on appeal than are the rulings of federal district court judges. 83. An appellate court reviews factual determinations made by the Commission under the highly deferential "substantial evidence" standard rather than the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to decisions made by lower court judges. Thus, federal courts of appeals "tend to go along with the SEC unless there's an egregious error," 84 but they apply tighter scrutiny of federal district court rulings.
Critics also dispute the efficiency of administrative proceedings, which the SEC frequently touts as one of the procedural advantages of proceeding in-house. 85 While the path from the order instituting proceedings to the ALJ's initial decision can indeed be rapid, the initial decision is not a final judgment and does not become final until the Commission issues an opinion on appeal or, if no party appeals the initial decision to the Commission, a notice of finality. 86 Therefore, the true length of an administrative otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute . . . ."), with FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."). The "substantial evidence" test "has always involved a large amount of deference to the relevant fact-finder" and "is a more deferential standard than the 'clearly erroneous' standard that [ 837 (1984) , the Supreme Court ruled that agency regulations "are given controlling weight" if Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation, and unless the regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Id. at 843-44. However, in a critique of the Commission's recent Flannery ruling, Professor Andrew Vollmer suggests several reasons why a reviewing court need not, and in many cases should not, grant Chevron deference to legal interpretations in an SEC adjudication. See generally Vollmer, supra note 20. Vollmer points to the statutory text of the Administrative Procedure Act, which commands that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law," and which "admit[s] no deference on legal questions." Id. at 326-27. Vollmer further observes that the Supreme Court has "not always accepted agency legal conclusions of ambiguous statutes as binding" and that "the actual practice of most courts of appeals is not to defer to the SEC on questions of law in an adjudication." Id. at 327-29. Principles of stare decisis also require courts to follow judicial precedent, especially when "an agency interpretation varies from the way the courts, especially the Supreme Court, has been interpreting and applying the same legal provision." Id. at 331. Finally, Vollmer observes that significant questions have been raised "about the obligation of a reviewing court to give controlling weight to the SEC's legal interpretations of Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5" and other laws "that contemplate[] both criminal and administrative enforcement." Id. at 333.
84. Eaglesham, supra note 78 (quoting Thomas Gorman, a former SEC attorney now at Dorsey & Whitney LLP).
85. See, e.g., Ceresney, Remarks to the ABA, supra note 4 ("[A]dministrative actions produce prompt decisions.").
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e) ("[P]etition to the Commission for review of an initial decision is a prerequisite to the seeking of judicial review of a final order entered pursuant to such decision."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); id. § 77i(a); Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) ("The Commission's final action is either in the form of a new decision after de novo review or, by declining to grant or order review, its embrace of the ALJ's initial decision as its own. In either event, the Commission has retained full decision-making powers, and the mere passage of time is not proceeding must take into account the time required for the Commission to review the initial decision and render a final judgment, which can be quite time consuming. In contrast to ALJs, who operate under strict time constraints, the Commission is under no mandatory deadline when ruling on appeals from ALJ decisions, 87 and its own discretionary guidelines are rarely followed in practice. 88 Indeed, data suggest that after factoring in delays associated with Commission review, "the overall period for completion of an administrative proceeding is likely slower than the time required to complete a trial in district court." 89 "[T]he SEC's approach enough to establish finality. And even when there is not full review by the Commission, it is the act of issuing the finality order that makes the initial decision the action of the Commission . . . .").
87. When an initial decision is appealed to the Commission, the Rules of Practice dictate that a final order "should" be issued within seven months from the date the petition for review is filed. 17 C.F.R. § 201.900(a)(1)(iii). The Commission can extend the deadline to eleven months from filing of the petition for review if it determines that the matter "presents unusual complicating circumstances." Id. The SEC retains discretion to further extend the deadline if it "determines that extraordinary facts and circumstances of the matter so require." Id. However, these deadlines are merely aspirational and are, in practice, often violated. See infra note 88.
88. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 (stating that between October 1, 2013, and March 31, 2015, only two of fifteen Commission opinions were issued within the guidelines period); see also Christian J. Mixter, The SEC's Administrative Law Enforcement Record, 49 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 69, 74-75 (2016) (noting that the Commission failed to meet its seven-month guideline in seventeen of the last twenty reporting periods and failed to meet the eleven-month guideline in ten of the last twenty reporting periods). The median disposition time for the issued opinions extended from 399 days to 600 days. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16. This is in addition to the time required for the ALJ to conduct a hearing and issue an initial decision. Accordingly, the total time required to move an administrative proceeding from initiation to Commission decision is actually much longer than the Commission concedes and will likely get even longer if the SEC's proposed revisions to the administrative process are implemented. See, e.g., Mixter, supra, at 75 (noting that for seven decisions, the average length from the order instituting proceedings to the Commission decision was two and a half years, and that "the Commission's recent proposal to amend its [administrative proceeding] rules augurs a review process that will move yet more slowly in the future"); Jean 89. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 (emphasis added). To be sure, district court cases can also languish for years. As of September 30, 2014, 11 percent means defendants often lose both ways. The trial portion of the civil case moves much more quickly than such matters typically would in federal court, giving limited time to prepare for trial, and defendants then can wait years for the SEC to decide appeals." 90 In the interim, reputations and careers can be ruined, regardless of the ultimate result. 91 Taken together, opponents of the Commission's regime complain that the path to circuit court review is long and expensive and that it involves such a high probability of having to operate under the shadow of an adverse finding that the prospect of meaningful review is more theoretical than real for many respondents. They explain that the SEC is well aware that most litigants do not have the resources or ability to defend a principle and would be forced to capitulate rather than endure the years of litigation and the extreme resource drain necessary to obtain a fair federal court review of an administrative proceeding. . . . In other words, the SEC is aware that experienced defense counsel perceive the SEC's in-house proceedings to be less fair, and the SEC uses this fact to reduce the number of its cases that are tested in the crucible of federal court, even if only on appeal. 92 Separate and apart from these complaints about the fairness of the SEC's proceedings as applied to any specific set of facts, concern persists that the Commission's push to administrative proceedings is designed to help the Commission substitute its interpretation of the federal securities laws for the views expressed by the federal judiciary. 93 (July 2, 2015) , http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ id=1202730989126/Is-It-Time-to-Reconsider-Chevron-Deference-for-SEC-Proceedings? mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL (noting that the Commission is "increasingly turning toward administrative proceedings with the express intent to develop the law") [https://perma.cc/TVX3-2LX4]; Ceresney, Keynote Speech, supra note 2 ("If a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission's rules, it may make sense to file the case as an administrative proceeding so a Commission decision on the issue, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development of the law."). Critics contend that administrative interpretation of the securities laws-a task historically borne by federal courts-"would not be good for the impartial development of the law in an area of immense practical importance," and is "unlikely . . . to lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial administrative proceeding, the SEC made this objective explicit. 94 Even though the Commission's decision in that matter was reversed and vacated, 95 this public policy bell cannot be unrung.
Historically, complex federal securities laws have often been developed and elucidated by federal court judges, 96 and there are many situations in which the Commission's interpretation of the federal securities laws conflicts with decisions reached by federal courts. 97 Because the interpretations as would result from having those cases brought in federal court." Rakoff, supra note 20, at 11; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 18 (suggesting that "[t]he Commission should resist utilizing its administrative forum for [the purpose of superseding a judicial opinion with which it disagrees] in the absence of compelling circumstances making such an effort an appropriate use of its Dodd-Frankgranted choice-of-forum capabilities"); Vollmer, supra note 20, at 278 ("The cumulative effect of an agency's decision to roll back Supreme Court precedent and to consolidate for itself ultimate decision-making power over questions of law traditionally left to the courts would seriously alter the balance of responsibility between agencies and courts long recognized in our system of government."). 96. See Rakoff, supra note 20, at 8. 97. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655-59 (1983) (rejecting the SEC's theory that a recipient of confidential information (i.e., the "tippee") must refrain from trading Commission expects that its interpretation of the federal securities laws will, under the doctrine of Chevron deference, take precedence over conflicting interpretations by the federal courts, 98 the Commission's push to the administrative forum could override decades of well-established judicial precedent fashioned by the federal judiciary and replace it with conflicting Commission interpretations that more aggressively support the SEC's enforcement agenda.
Litigation is also afoot challenging the constitutionality of the process by which ALJs are appointed and can be removed. 99 The resolution of this "whenever he receives inside information from an insider"); 98. See Rakoff, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that "an S.E.C. administrative judge's formal ruling on an otherwise undecided issue of statutory interpretation of the securities law is, just like rules enacted by the Commission, entitled to 'Chevron' deference"); Vollmer, supra note 20, at 275 (noting that in Flannery, "[t]he Commission not only advanced expansive legal conclusions, but it also insisted that the courts accept the agency's legal interpretations as controlling"). Critics have questioned whether Chevron deference remains appropriate in light of the Commission's increased reliance on its own administrative proceedings to resolve complex questions of federal securities law. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 93 ("[T]he Chevron decision did not appear to foresee nor pre-authorize the ability of the agency to foster a 'home field' litigation advantage to 'develop the law,' particularly in procedural circumstances where it appears the agency has an unfair advantage over respondents compared to federal district court."); see also Vollmer, supra note 62, at 8 ("It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct to an agency's interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another to require regulated parties to divine the agency's interpretations in advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference." constitutional dispute, significant as it is, will not affect the debate about the fairness of the SEC's administrative procedures, because the constitutional controversy implicates the process by which ALJs are nominated and not the rules of procedure under which they operate. The concerns over the fairness of SEC administrative proceedings that animate proposals for reform will therefore survive any resolution of the constitutional controversy, as long as administrative actions continue in their current form.
II. THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE
The Commission is well aware of these criticisms, and has responded with two distinct strategies.
First, the Commission's Division of Enforcement has issued a statement identifying four factors that it considers when deciding whether to proceed through the administrative forum or in federal court: (1) "the availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum"; (2) "whether any charged party is a registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity"; (3) "the cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each forum"; and (4) "the fair, consistent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and matters." 100 Critics have characterized the factors as "nonexhaustive, nonmandatory and unweighted," and as not placing any meaningful limit on the Commission's exercise of discretion. 101 Critics also contend that "any consideration of defendants' rights, beyond their impact on the SEC's costs, is glaringly absent" from the guidance. 102 Indeed, the Commission could, as a practical matter, bring many cases in either the administrative or federal forum while citing the same four factors as support for its decision. 103 As a practical matter, it is easy to understand why the Commission might not want to constrain its prosecutorial discretion. However, the price of this policy is inevitable (and understandable) criticism over the SEC's lack of precision in offering guidance.
Second, the Commission has amended its Rules of Practice, 104 primarily to allow for a limited number of depositions and to provide additional time for preparation in administrative proceedings. 105 With respect to depositions, the Commission's new Rules of Practice permit the staff and respondents to take up to three depositions each in single-respondent cases and up to five depositions each in multiple-respondent cases. 106 The Rules of Practice also allow each side to take two additional depositions upon a showing of compelling need. 107 Depositions are permitted only in the longest, most complex cases; parties in other types of proceedings are not permitted to notice depositions. 108 Criticism of this new approach was swift and sharp. 109 To be sure, five or seven depositions are better than none, but critics ask where the magic numbers of five and seven come from. What is the basis for these limitations, or are they arbitrary and capricious? 110 And, not only are five and seven a small number of depositions in complex matters, "but figuring out which witnesses to depose may involve a large degree of guesswork if the agency took testimony from a number of people in its investigation, as is often the case." 111 Further, in cases involving multiple respondents, disputes can arise among the respondents as to which witnesses should be deposed: some witnesses are likely to be more helpful or damaging to some respondents than to others. 112 Instead of limiting the number of depositions according to a predetermined range, critics recommend that the Rules of 106. See id. at *8-11. There is no separate provision for expert witness depositions. The three to five depositions permitted by the amended rules must therefore include both fact and expert witnesses. Id.
107. See id. at *10-11. 108. See id. at *9. 109. See, e.g., JONES DAY, supra note 104 (noting that the "limits on depositions in the amended rules remain arbitrary and formulaic" and that "providing 'equivalent' discoverysuch as the same number of depositions-to the respondent and to the Division of Enforcement during the pendency of an [administrative proceeding] does nothing at all to address the immense informational imbalance in the Commission's favor following the investigatory phase, when the Commission's power to discover and depose is virtually unlimited, while the respondent's ability to do the same hardly exists"); CADWALADER, supra note 56 (noting that "the limited number of depositions permitted is likely insufficient to have much impact on larger scale investigations involving numerous actors or multiple jurisdictions"). Some have critiqued the Commission's proposed amendments to Rule of Practice 233, which would have extended the number of depositions in complex cases to three for single-respondent cases and five for multirespondent cases without any opportunity to seek additional depositions. See Richard Foster, Senior Vice President and Senior Counsel for Regulatory and Legal Affairs, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice 3 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Foster Comment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-7.pdf ("The restricted number of depositions for respondents is prejudicial.") [https://perma.cc/ JMV2-H6R4]; Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 6-9 (arguing that the proposed change in prehearing depositions is deficient in a number of respects and does not level the playing field); Henning, supra note 71 ("[A]llowing only three-or at most fivedepositions seems like an artificially low limit that will not do much to aid those accused of a violation in a complex case."); see also Why the SEC's Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate-Part II, supra note 61 (arguing that the proposed rules "allow an arbitrary number of depositions that is divorced from any analysis of what cases really require, and from any recognition that these are far from 'one size fits all' cases").
110. See supra note 104. 111. Henning, supra note 71. 112. See, e.g., JONES DAY, supra note 104 (noting that in multirespondent cases, "some respondents may find themselves left out, with no guaranteed method to explore the factual allegations against them").
Practice be flexible and give ALJs discretion to increase the number of depositions each party can take. 113 In its defense, the Commission might observe that many other federal agencies do not permit any depositions as part of the hearing process 114 and that depositions are not available in criminal proceedings without a court order and only then in exceptional circumstances. 115 From this perspective, the Commission could be viewed as more accommodating than its peers. That defense does not, however, respond directly to the substance of the opposition's critiques: the number of permitted depositions remains arbitrarily small. 116 The Commission also amended its Rules of Practice to lengthen the time period during which respondents can prepare for a hearing and take the depositions that the Commission now permits. 117 Administrative proceedings can "have multiple defendants and may involve hundreds of thousands of pages of documents related to numerous clients and transactions. Under the current rules, even the most complex matter must be decided within 300 days, with the hearing to begin only four months after filing the charges." 118 Under the new rules, a hearing can begin as late as ten months after the filing of the charges in the most complex matters. 119. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *54. Prior to the recently adopted amendments to the SEC's Rules of Practice, Rule 360 required the Commission to designate the time period for preparation of the initial decision as either 120, 210, or 300 days from the Again, while this extension of time is an advance over the current state of affairs, critics complain that the prehearing discovery period remains "extremely short," 120 particularly when measured against the time periods involved in comparably complex federal litigation. These rule changes also do not address a fundamental asymmetry in the administrative process. As previously observed, the Commission's staff often will have had years with which to prepare its case and take witness testimony, while respondents remain subject to a "rocket docket"-though less "rocket" than in the past-that forces them to prepare for trial within a relatively short time frame. 121 Here too, critics recommend that the Rules of Practice permit the ALJ "to depart from the default timelines wherever the complexity or other circumstances of the case reasonably justify such a departure." 122 In its defense, the Commission can continue to argue that respondent counsel can, on occasion, "shadow" the SEC's investigation and obtain additional information well before the issuance of the formal order For criticisms directed at the Commission's proposed rule, which would have extended the prehearing discovery period in complex cases for up to eight months, see Foster Comment Letter, supra note 109, at 3, noting that the proposed time limit was "too short and unrealistic," and Henning, supra note 71, stating that "the time in which an administrative case would be completed is still fairly short."
121. See supra notes 57-58; see also CADWALADER, supra note 56 ("Additional prehearing preparation time and a limited ability to depose witnesses hardly compares to the fact that the Enforcement Division has virtually unlimited discovery opportunities during the course of an investigation (for example, during SEC investigative testimony, only the SEC counsel and the witnesses' counsel are present, and the target of the investigation cannot even attend-much less examine-a witness or object to the questions asked).").
122. See e.g., Olson Comment Letter, supra note 113, at 3; see also JONES DAY, supra note 104 ("[D]ue process demands that procedural rules provide for the ability to tailor such limits to the facts and complexities of a particular enforcement action. This is especially true with many Commission enforcement actions, which can involve accounting, financial, and trading and markets issues far more intricate and complex than many cases litigated in federal court."); Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 10-11 (recommending that the proposed language be revised to enable the ALJ, for good cause, to extend the period between the filing of the order instituting proceedings and the commencement of instituting proceedings. 123 In these instances, the burden imposed by the SEC's timetable might not be as onerous as critics suggest. However, if the respondent is, for any reason, unable to effectively "shadow" the investigation, 124 the burden of even the new, lengthened timetable can be substantial. This distinction perpetuates, but ameliorates, a preexisting inequity in the Commission's hearing procedures: respondents who have the ability to "shadow" are less disadvantaged by the Commission's timelines and discovery restrictions than respondents who, for any reason, lack that capacity.
The Commission also amended its evidentiary rules to formally exclude "unreliable" evidence and to clarify that "hearsay may be admitted if it is relevant, material, and bears satisfactory indicia of reliability so that its use is fair." 125 Commenters were quick to observe that this standard makes "what is already an unfair aspect of [administrative] proceedings even worse" by "codify[ing] the ALJ practice of treating investigative transcripts as a reliable form of 'sworn statement'" and by "codify[ing] the acceptability of hearsay evidence more generally, apparently without regard to a realistic examination of reliability." 126 Indeed, under the SEC's new rule, "some out-of-court statements, like the investigative testimony of witnesses, could be considered without having to call them to attend the hearing, which avoids the risk they might say something different or lose credibility on cross examination." 127 Even under the new rules, the small number of depositions available to respondents can be viewed as especially troubling in light of the prospect of dozens of potential investigative witnesses having their testimony admitted without the respondent having any right to depose or cross-examine, particularly in large, complex matters. 128 http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-foradministrative-proceedings/ ("[I]n complex cases, which the Commission has increasingly authorized to proceed in its in-house courts, three or five depositions per side could be woefully inadequate . . . the proposed changes deny respondents the ability to depose all critical witnesses in complex cases, which generally exceed three or five in total.") [https://perma.cc/2LHL-RAAM].
129. See, e.g., Foster Comment Letter, supra note 109, at 3 (arguing that " [t] he admission of hearsay evidence should be consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence"); Olson Comment Letter, supra note 113, at 8 (" [T] he Rules of Practice should prohibit the admission of hearsay, subject to the various hearsay exceptions recognized under the Federal Rules of Evidence."); see also Quaadman Comment Letter, supra note 61, at 11-12 (arguing that the proposed rule does not go far enough in restricting hearsay, and recommending that the proponent of hearsay evidence be required to justify its admission with factual evidence The Commission defends its new approach by observing that its standard is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act 130 and by expressing the view that "a case-by-case determination of the admissibility of hearsay evidence is more appropriate than the broad exclusionary rules and procedures" proposed by critics of the new rule. 131 In the aggregate, as a leading legal columnist writing for the New York Times has observed, these measures are "at best small steps in responding to criticism about truncated rights." 132 To be sure, the Commission can respond to these criticisms by further liberalizing its rules to allow ALJs to set any number of depositions and to allow additional forms of discovery. The Commission also could lengthen the calendar for proceedings before ALJs, harmonize its evidentiary rules with the Federal Rules of Evidence, and do a better job of following its own internal guidelines regarding the resolution of appeals. But even if these reforms are forthcoming, critics are unlikely to be fully appeased. 133 establishing the "reliability of the proposed testimony and demonstrating that its admission will not abridge the opposing party's right to effective cross-examination").
130. See SEC Final Rules, supra note 55, at *26. 131. Id. 132. Henning, supra note 9.
133. In addition to the changes already noted, the Commission's new Rules of Practice alter the requirements for serving an order instituting proceedings (OIP) on a person in a foreign country (Rule 141); "allow a stay pending Commission consideration of settlement offers to also stay the timelines set forth in Rule 360" (Rule 161); "allow the Commission or a hearing officer to exclude or summarily suspend a person for any portion of a deposition, as well as the proceeding, a conference, or a hearing" (Rule 180); require a respondent to state in its answer to an OIP "whether the respondent is asserting any avoidance or affirmative defenses, including but not limited to res judicata, statute of limitations, or reliance" (Rule 220); add depositions, expert witness disclosures or reports, the timing for completion of production of documents, and the filing of any dispositive motion pursuant to Rule 250 to the list of subjects to be discussed at the prehearing conference (Rule 221); require a party calling an expert witness to provide a brief summary of the expert's expected testimony, a statement of the expert's qualifications, a list of other proceedings in which the expert has opined during the previous four years, and a list of publications authored by the expert during the previous ten years (Rule 222); "provide that the Division may redact certain sensitive personal information from documents that will be made available, unless the information concerns the person to whom the documents are being produced," and "to clarify that the Division may withhold or redact documents that reflect settlement negotiations with persons or entities who are not respondents in the proceeding at issue" (Rule 230); adopt standards for a motion to quash or modify a subpoena (Rule 232); extend the maximum length of each deposition to seven hours (Rule 233); "provide that the moving party may take a deposition on written questions either by stipulation of the parties or by filing a motion demonstrating good cause" (Rule 234); permit parties, upon a motion, to introduce deposition testimony, investigative testimony, or certain sworn declarations (Rule 235); to amend the list of documents admissible as a prior sworn statement to include depositions taken pursuant to Rules 233 or 234, as well as investigative testimony and declarations taken under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and to permit the use of statements made by a party or a party's officers, directors, or managing agents, and to clarify that such statements may be used by an adverse party for any purpose (Rule 235); permit three different types of dispositive motions to be filed at different stages of an administrative proceeding (Rule 250); adjust the timing of administrative proceedings by designating "the time period for preparation of the initial decision as 30, 75 or 120 days from the completion of post-hearing or dispositive motion briefing or a finding of a default" (Rule 360); and amend various appellate rules and guidelines. SEC Final Rules, supra note 55.
III. THE DATA
Ideally, empirical analysis of the Commission's litigation performance would shed objective light on this debate and provide clear guidance as to whether and how administrative procedures should be reformed. Life is not so simple.
In particular, it is commonly argued that a comparison of the Commission's win-loss ratios in administrative proceedings and federal court litigation should provide constructive insight as to whether the Commission has a home-court advantage in administrative proceedings. A material portion of the empirical debate in this vein relies on data gathered by the Wall Street Journal suggesting that
[t]he SEC won against 90% of defendants before its own judges in contested cases from October 2010 through March of [2015] . . . . That was markedly higher than the 69% success the agency obtained against defendants in federal court over the same period, based on SEC data. Going back to October 2004, the SEC has won against at least four of five defendants in front of its own judges every fiscal year. 134 From these data, critics reason that the Commission does indeed have a home-court advantage and that it brings some actions in-house because it cannot win those cases in federal court. 135 These data also have been cited as evidence of bias in various constitutional challenges to the Commission's administrative law proceedings. 136 The Commission has responded with vigor, describing these claims as "garbage" and stating "categorically that [it is] rubbish" to assert that the SEC is avoiding federal court because it has an advantage before ALJs. 137 Table 1 Federal court subpoena enforcement proceedings, contempt proceedings, proceedings seeking freeze orders, and other similar actions are thus excluded from the analysis. 138 Including these actions in the analysis would substantially increase the Commission's measured success rate in federal court. Table 1 measures outcomes in trials, summary judgments, and litigated admission settlements. A trial or summary judgment is deemed a victory for the Commission if the Commission prevails on one or more claims against any defendant in a manner that entitles the Commission to relief under the federal securities laws, even if no relief is ultimately awarded. A ruling or verdict for the Commission as to an element of an offense, absent a finding that a defendant actually violated a provision of the federal securities laws, is not counted as a Commission victory, because the Commission would still have to establish the fact of the violation. Litigated admission settlements arise when litigation is initiated (i.e., a complaint is filed without a simultaneous settlement), and the defendant later enters into a settlement in which the defendant admits to facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the federal securities laws. Situations in which the Commission initiates litigation and then resolves the matter with a "neither admit nor deny" settlement 139 are excluded from the analysis, as are cases that settle simultaneously with filing. The analysis in table 1 is on a per-case basis and does not measure outcomes by defendant. 140 138. The following types of cases are excluded from this analysis: (1) cases that settle simultaneously with the filing of a complaint (even if admissions are obtained), (2) cases that settle with no admissions, (3) subpoena enforcement proceedings, (4) contempt proceedings, (5) cases that result in a default judgment, (6) 12(j) actions to delist a company, (7) followon administrative proceedings, and (8) These data suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between the SEC's success rate before ALJs and its success rate in federal court when summary judgments and admission settlements are included in the analysis. 141 By this metric, as described in panel (a) of table 1, the Commission's success rate is 95 percent in administrative proceedings and a statistically indistinguishable 87 percent in federal court proceedings. Including summary judgments but excluding admission settlements, as described in panel (b) of table 1, leads to similar results, with the Commission prevailing in 94 percent of administrative proceedings and in 86 percent of federal trials.
Again, the difference is statistically insignificant. 142 Only if summary judgments and admission settlements are excluded from the analysis does a statistically significant difference emerge. Then, as described in panel (c) of table 1, the Commission wins 94 percent of its administrative proceedings but only 74 percent of its federal court proceedings. 143 These data are comparable to the statistics reported by the Wall Street Journal. 144 However, from a defendant's perspective, a summary judgment loss is every bit as real as a trial loss. Indeed, a defendant's summary judgment loss could, if anything, be taken as a greater vindication of the SEC's claim because the court has ruled that no rational jury could find in defendant's favor. 145 From this perspective, it makes little sense to exclude cases in which the Commission prevails either by summary judgment or admission settlement. Accordingly, the data suggest that, in the aggregate, the Commission has no particular advantage or disadvantage in federal court or before an ALJ.
The data do, however, suggest that the Commission's success ratio in insider trading cases is far worse than in other forms of litigation. As documented in panel (d) of table 1, the Commission's win-loss record in federal court insider trading cases is eight to six, or 57 percent. These six losses constitute six of eight, or 75 percent, of all of the Commission's federal court losses over the measurement period. If insider trading cases are netted from the analysis, as in faring slightly better in administrative proceedings than in federal court, but this difference is again not statistically significant. 146 This finding challenges the claim that the Commission has a home-court advantage before its ALJs and that it attempts to exploit this advantage. Indeed, if the enforcement division believed that it has the upper hand before ALJs, then it would have rationally filed these post-Dodd-Frank insider trading claims as administrative proceedings and not as federal complaints. The Commission's decision to file these cases in federal court is thus inconsistent with the hypothesis that the SEC steers its weaker cases to its administrative courts.
The question then arises as to why the Commission's track record in its insider trading litigation has been so uniquely poor. An analysis of this issue opens the door to a broader critique suggesting that win-loss data are, in general, unreliable guideposts by which to measure the fairness of the Commission's administrative proceedings.
As an initial proposition, insider trading cases that proceed to trial reflect a strong selection bias. The strongest cases are prosecuted criminally by the Department of Justice. Once the government wins those cases, the Commission can prevail in a civil follow-on action, but, given our counting rules, those "easy wins" are not scored as Commission victories. 147 At the other end of the spectrum, when the Commission has a strong civil case that does not attract criminal scrutiny, defendants will rationally settle by giving the Commission largely all the relief it seeks. The easy wins are thus off the table, and the cases that proceed to trial are likely to be the most contentious matters in which the Commission and defendants cannot agree on a settlement. These bargaining failures often result from differing expectations as to the outcome of the case once all of the evidence is presented and are more likely to arise when reasonable litigators can have differing views as to subjective factors, such as the credibility of witnesses, that can be outcome determinative in insider trading litigation. 148 Bargaining failures are also more likely to arise when there is uncertainty as to the definition of the law, as is the case in the law of insider trading, which is not statutorily defined and which is subject to ongoing dispute, most notably over the definition of the personal benefit test. 149 Further, the Commission's "zero-tolerance" approach to insider trading generates an institutional incentive to proceed even with weaker cases. Indeed, to maintain the integrity of this initiative, the Commission could rationally prefer a loss at trial, as a matter of principle, than a settlement of convenience that might signal a wavering commitment to its campaign against insider trading. The notion that difficult cases can proceed to trial on grounds of "principle," even if the rational economic decision is to settle, is also present on the defendant's side of the table. This dynamic is effectively illustrated by Mark Cuban's decision to reject a Commission settlement offer that would have cost a small fraction of Cuban's ultimate defense costs when he proceeded to defeat the Commission's insider trading claims in federal court. 150 In addition, the Commission can point to recent litigation failures in the administrative forum as evidence that is inconsistent with the argument that it has a home-court advantage before ALJs. 151 Selection effects of this sort are hardly rare in the empirical analysis of litigation outcomes and commonly make it difficult to interpret win-loss statistics. 152 Win-loss statistics also fail to adjust for each case's degree of difficulty. Consider, for example, the win-loss record that results if each case brought before an ALJ is a relatively straightforward matter in which the Commission clearly has the upper hand. A high win percentage for the Commission in its home court would then not be evidence of bias at all. It would, instead, be evidence that the Commission brings strong cases in the administrative venue. Simple win-loss data also fail to measure the extent to which the Commission receives the relief it seeks. The Commission can, for example, prevail on all substantive claims in an administrative proceeding, yet fail to obtain any of the relief it sought. 153 While our methodology describes this outcome as a Commission victory, the SEC could rationally view it as a Pyrrhic victory, or a technical defeat, because of the ALJ's failure to impose any of the sanctions sought. Moreover, winloss data treat all cases as equally significant, when they are not. Some litigated matters reflect small potatoes disputes that have no meaningful precedential effects, whereas others address major legal principles that can have broad ranging implications for large sectors of the markets. This failure to adjust for the practical significance of each trial result is yet another limitation of the win-loss mode of analysis.
Most significantly, perhaps, the Commission's historical practice of litigating against regulated entities before ALJs, and only rarely litigating matters not involving regulated entities before ALJs, 154 establishes the potential for a profound selection bias. The types of fact patterns, causes of action, and nature of defenses in these cases is likely to differ in a systematic manner that cannot be captured by win-loss statistics.
A focus on win-loss statistics also masks an elephant in the room. The vast majority of SEC enforcement actions, whether filed in federal court or as administrative proceedings, are settled simultaneously with the initiation of the action. 155 These settled actions do not enter into the win-loss calculations, yet the most significant effect of the SEC's actual or threatened shift to administrative proceedings may be on the terms of the settlements generated in both federal and administrative proceedings. 156 Indeed, the data show a recent, sharp increase in the percentage of settled SEC enforcement proceedings that were filed as administrative proceedings rather than in federal court. In particular, in fiscal years 2010 through 2013, "the SEC brought more than 65 percent of its actions against public company defendants in civil court," but fiscal years 2014 and 2015 "saw a dramatic shift . . . [as] the SEC's venue of choice became its administrative court," with the Commission bringing only 24 percent of its actions in federal court. 157 Some observers suggest that these and other data indicate that the "SEC's ability to extract settlements has increased with the flexibility to choose its forum provided by Dodd Frank." 158 While it is entirely true that the Commission can extract settlements in administrative proceedings far larger than the settlements available prior to the DoddFrank Act, it does not necessarily follow that the Commission is using the administrative forum as a vehicle in which to bring weaker cases or in which to extract higher settlements, all other factors being equal (although they are not).
Instead, defendants in SEC proceedings could rationally prefer to settle matters in the administrative forum because the stigma associated with a settled administrative proceeding, which typically gives rise to an administrative cease-and-desist order, could be viewed as being less serious than the stigma associated with a settled federal proceeding, which typically gives rise to a federal injunction. Also, by settling in an administrative forum, both the Commission and the respondent eliminate the risk that the federal court judge reviewing the settlement might raise objections to a bargain that is entirely acceptable to both litigants. 159 Thus, a finding that post-Dodd-Frank settlements imposing penalties on unregulated entities have migrated from the federal to the administrative forum may reflect defendant preferences as much as the exercise of applying enforcement discretion. This observation suggests the existence of a simultaneity issue that can vex the analysis of settlement data seeking to discern a cause-andeffect relationship resulting from the delegation of section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Taken together, these observations urge extreme caution in interpreting win-loss data and settlement statistics in the debate over the fairness of the Commission's administrative proceedings.
Commission opponents overstate their case by relying on the Wall Street Journal statistics, which omit summary judgments and admission settlements and fail to consider the differential results in insider trading prosecutions, as "evidence" that the administrative process is biased in the Commission's favor. 160 By the same token, Commission supporters overstate their case by pointing to statistically indistinguishable win-loss ratios in federal court and administrative proceedings as evidence that the Commission's administrative process is fair and needs no reform. 161 Notwithstanding these statistical analyses, it cannot be denied that forum selection decisions can be outcome determinative. Two high-profile cases are sufficient to demonstrate this simple but central proposition. The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Newman, 162 sharply limiting the nature of transactions that could be viewed as satisfying the Dirks personal benefit test, 163 would never have resulted from a Commission enforcement proceeding. 164 Similarly, many federal courts would never have agreed with the Commission's decision in Flannery, 165 which dramatically narrowed the reach of the Supreme Court's decision in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders 166 and asserted a muscular application of the Chevron deference doctrine to the Commission's administrative decisions. 167 Thus, even if win-loss data show no statistically significant difference between outcomes in administrative and federal court proceedings, the forum selection decision is not a matter of indifference, particularly as to the interpretation of contentious areas of the law.
IV. IMPLEMENTING A MECHANISM DESIGN SOLUTION THROUGH A SELECTIVE REMOVAL STATUTE
The debate over the proper allocation of SEC enforcement proceedings between administrative and judicial venues, and over the appropriate level of procedural safeguards in administrative proceedings, is evidently complex. The battling camps express extreme positions. While critics advocate reforms that would effectively eliminate administrative proceedings as a means of resolving many, or even most, disputes, 168 defenders hope that modest tweaks will forestall sweeping reforms. 169 This Article suggests a middle ground: a properly crafted removal statute can promote an optimal allocation of litigation between the administrative and federal forums, while simultaneously creating incentives for the SEC to reform its internal procedures in a manner that builds confidence that its internal procedures are, in fact, fair and efficient.
This proposal rests on the observation that it is possible, ex ante, to conclude that some cases should rationally be channeled to the administrative forum but that others are better resolved in federal court. Many cases, however, are not so easily categorized in advance. For these cases, there is a need for a mechanism that allows an objective third partynot the Commission itself-to determine whether the case should proceed in an administrative or federal forum. As explained in greater detail below, a carefully crafted discretionary removal statute can allow the federal courts to perform this filtering function in a manner that does not overburden federal dockets, does not inordinately delay the resolution of disputes, and provides incentives for the SEC to assure fairness and efficiency in its administrative proceedings.
The basic contours of such a statute are straightforward. As an initial matter, the statute would define a category of enforcement actions that are assigned to the administrative forum and as to which respondents would have no right to seek removal. For these cases, the current law regarding the Commission's ability to select a forum would remain unchanged. While reasonable observers can differ over the precise definition of cases that should be designated for this category, several guiding principles can inform this classification decision. In particular, cases that raise technical matters likely to be within the SEC's greater competence, cases that involve 167 . See Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *18, *20-22 (noting disagreements with several district court decisions).
168. See supra note 23. 169. For a discussion of recently adopted amendments to the SEC's Rules of Practice, see supra Part II. formalistic violations, cases in which the stakes at issue are relatively small, or cases that implicate the integrity of the Commission's internal processes (such as the right to appear before the SEC), could reasonably be assigned to this category.
The second category would be composed of enforcement actions that must be filed in federal court unless the defendant consents to proceeding in an administrative forum. Conceptually, these cases would implicate questions of fact or law that, on a categorical basis, are better resolved in federal district court. Defining this category in advance is more difficult than identifying a set of cases that can rationally be assigned to the administrative arena. Indeed, if this categorization decision is based exclusively on the empirical analysis presented in Part III of this Articlewhich is not the decision rule advocated by this analysis-then only insider trading litigation appears to present characteristics that would support a presumption that the litigation should be heard in federal court. However, reasonable arguments can be presented to support the conclusion that larger, more complex matters should also automatically be assigned to federal court. For example, cases seeking penalties or disgorgement in excess of a predetermined dollar amount, or involving a number of witnesses that exceeds a particular threshold, also might be required to proceed in federal court unless the defendant consents to an administrative proceeding.
The third category would be composed of cases as to which it is difficult to determine, on an a priori basis, whether they are better resolved in administrative proceedings or in federal court. These cases are, effectively, the residual that does not fit in either of the first two categories. For these cases, the statute would provide respondents with a right to petition a federal court for an order removing the case from the Commission's administrative proceedings and assigning it to federal court. The grant of the order would be at the discretion of the district court judge to whom the petition is assigned.
This process can be modeled on existing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 170 which creates a discretionary interlocutory appeal from a district court decision ruling on a motion for class certification. Indeed, the very rationale for the adoption of Rule 23(f) mirrors the rationale for the adoption of a removal statute. Rule 23(f)'s drafters recognized that the class certification decision can, as a practical matter, be outcome determinative without regard to the merits of the underlying action. 171 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 171. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 565 (1996) . Addressing proposed revisions to Civil Rule 23(f), the Advisory Committee noted that
[a]n order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low cost by Granting the courts of appeal a discretionary right to engage in interlocutory review therefore promotes the interests of justice. 172 By the same token, if there is concern that the decision to proceed as an administrative matter is also outcome determinative, then it is also reasonable to provide for a third party review of that decision. The most reasonable third party reviewer is the federal district court that would hear the matter if it was not committed to the administrative process. The district court's decision whether to grant the proposed removal petition should not be standardless. To provide guidance for court and litigants, the statute could define a set of "core factors" that would govern the district court's consideration of removal motions, much as the courts have evolved "core factors" that govern Rule 23(f) proceedings. 173 These factors might include (1) whether the presence of a jury or of an Article III judge as a fact-finder would materially promote the interests of justice; (2) whether the litigation involves a level of factual complexity that is more equitably resolved through the application of the discovery and evidentiary rules applied in federal court than through the application of the procedural rules that govern the Commission's administrative proceedings; (3) whether the litigation involves the application of a substantively complex regulatory regime that is better addressed by an ALJ than by a jury or by an Article III judge; (4) whether the implications of the remedy sought by the Commission are sufficiently substantial that federal court proceedings are more appropriate; (5) whether the litigation presents questions of law that would benefit from resolution by the federal judiciary, rather than by the Commission seeking Chevron deference to its interpretation of the federal securities laws; (6) whether the respondent is a regulated entity; and (7) whether the federal court's docket is such that the efficient administration of justice calls for resolution of the matter in the administrative forum.
Simply articulating a three-part statutory categorization along with "core factors" to guide the courts in exercising their removal discretion in the third category of litigation would be insufficient to operationalize the statute because a host of technical matters remain to be addressed. In particular, the statute would have to (1) designate a time period within which the petition would have to be filed, (2) identify the district court(s) in which petitions may be filed, (3) explain whether administrative proceedings are stayed while the district court considers the petition, (4) explain whether a petition is deemed denied or granted if the district court fails to reach a decision within a stated time period or whether the district court has an unlimited time period during which to consider a petition, and (5) address whether there is a presumption for or against granting the establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues.
Id.
172. Id. petition or whether no such presumption exists. The resolution of these technical considerations could obviously have an important influence on the frequency with which removal petitions might be granted. For example, if the statute establishes a presumption against the grant of a petition and states that petitions shall be deemed denied unless granted within four weeks of filing, then the probability of removal would be lower than if the statute establishes a presumption in favor of the grant and states that the petition shall be deemed granted unless denied within four weeks of filing. The devil, as is often the case, is in the details.
It bears emphasis that the goal of this discretionary removal provision is not to cause a massive migration of litigation from the SEC's administrative process to the federal courts.
The discretionary removal statute contemplated by this proposal can be crafted so that its primary effect is to present the SEC with powerful incentives to reform its internal procedures so that the federal courts do not feel compelled to grant removal petitions with great frequency. Indeed, to the extent that a removal statute stimulates the Commission to reform its internal processes so that they are perceived as fair and efficient by the courts and by Congress, and not just by the Commission, removal legislation can promote the interests of justice without overburdening the federal court dockets.
CONCLUSION
The Commission faces a storm of criticism over the fairness of its internal administrative proceedings. It also faces criticism over its efforts to expand the number of cases brought as administrative proceedings and not filed in federal court. This criticism is amplified by concern that the SEC seeks to control the evolution of the federal securities laws by insisting on Chevron deference to its litigated administrative decisions while simultaneously limiting the number of occasions on which the federal courts will be able to interpret federal securities laws.
The Commission can respond to many of these concerns by changing its internal policies, and recently adopted amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice 174 indicate that the Commission is not deaf to these concerns. But these internal reforms may be insufficient to address broader concerns over the operation of the Commission's administrative proceedings. Properly designed legislation that grants respondents in some SEC enforcement proceedings the right to petition for removal to federal court can provide powerful incentives for the Commission to reform its internal procedures so that they are perceived as fair and efficient by Congress and the courts, not just by the Commission. The same legislation can also clearly define categories of cases that must be filed as administrative proceedings and cases that must be brought in federal court, thereby further reducing concern that the Commission is directing litigation to the administrative forum for an improper purpose. Properly structured, such a discretionary removal statute may well be the best available design
